

APPRECIATING ART APPRECIATION

VICTOR YELVERTON HAINES, DAWSON COLLEGE

SUMMARY

The ultimate goal of art, like life, is often considered to be appreciation — art appreciation or appreciation of the good life. Indeed art may be defined as a game with the goal of appreciation: the aim of the game is to appreciate the activity of playing it. So what is appreciation? This activity central to art education and even the ontology of art itself deserves to be appreciated. What accounts for the restraint on the objects of our appreciation? How is it that we appreciate a threat but not a rape.

WE APPRECIATE ART

Appreciating art appreciation is not so easy. Specific artworks are severally appreciated and that's enough to say we appreciate art, even though the nature of art in general is not something we may very well be able to express our appreciation of. The complexity of art fits together with the complexity of appreciation to form the simple gestalt of an artwork we appreciate. But art appreciation itself cannot be the object of appreciation except as a generality, which must be understood in the complexity of its parts, unless you're someone who finds it useful for something else, like a teacher of art appreciation who finds it useful for making a living. In itself, art appreciation can be appreciated only through a jagged analysis of what appreciation is and what art is, each ripped away from the other in isolation.

Art we can leave in this analysis to the ontology of another day and concentrate here on appreciation—also the preserve of aesthetics as the science of the appeal of value. Nevertheless, what kind of an object art is may be illuminated by an appreciation of the semantic structure of the complex word *appreciate* and the kind of object it takes.

We want to appreciate architecture, the world around us, literature, the performing arts, the activity of friends. Students follow courses in art appreciation, music appreciation, the appreciation of poetry. We are encouraged to appreciate nature. In this cultural economy of appreciation, the semantics of the complex word *appreciate* are innately understood. Whenever the word is used it is always the same word and understood with all its complexity in force. Whereas homonyms like *be* and bumble *bee*

are easily kept distinct as two different words and can only be forced together in a pun, *appreciate* has not evolved any meaning so specialized that the word has now become two separate words with the same pronunciation. Every use of the word is still the same word with all the parameters of its complex semantics. What it means to write an appreciation of the Battle of Jutland involves both your recognition of what it is and the value of its relevance to you in your world version. Such relevance entails the appeal of an existential value. To “size up” is not merely to take the “size of.” Fact and value have not been pried apart in the existential semantics of *appreciate*, just as in making the world where you are, they are both necessary.

We distinguish slight differences in meaning and likelihood of context in the semantics of a complex word such as *appreciate*. Consider the following two uses of *appreciate*: “I appreciate taking my time”; “I appreciate being able to take my time.” Although both are English sentences, we recognize the latter sentence as more natural. Why? William Empson lamented in 1977 that his book *The Structure of Complex Words* (1954) had been ignored by linguists even though he had claimed that “there is likely to be an inner grammar of complex words like the overt grammar of sentences” (viii). At the end of the millennium, he might have felt vindicated by the argument of Chomsky's *Minimalist Program* that language is innate, with syntax comprised of both categorial structure and semantic distinctions in the logical form (LF) of expressions in natural language (Chapter Four). The innate cognitive faculty of language allows us not only to discern “I appreciate to take my time” as ill-formed grammatically but also to discern “being able to take my time” as an exterior intentionality or external condition of the world more suitable for sizing up in relation to your own enjoyment of value than is your own decision and course of action in “taking your time.” Thus, “being able to take my time” is more suitable or likely as an object of appreciation that can be sized up and appreciated for what it is. A theory of semantic fields takes vocabulary as well as grammar and phonology to be linguistically structured. Following Stephen Ullmann and earlier linguists such as Humbolt and the Port Royal grammarians in a nativist research program, Adrienne Lehrer presents evidence that “the words of a language can be classified into sets which

are related to conceptual fields" (15). As Chomsky concludes, semantics would seem to be part of the innate syntax of human language.

Excavation in the semantic field of a complex word such as *appreciation* reveals what is it to use it and what the ontology of our appreciation is at its interface with art. The methodology of such an investigation is linguistic as an inquiry into meaning already innately in place, rather than a labeling of situations and processes empirically discovered in the physical or social world. The verb *appreciate* belongs to a semantic family with ancestry in the Latin *pretium preti* "price" with relatives, such as *pretiosus*, -a, -um "costly, precious, or extravagant" in that ancient family of meanings where to belong is to be worthy. Its English trace appears in a cluster of value terms for recognizing or sizing up what something is, which if being is positive can only be of some positive value. Recognition in this lineage draws on the heritage of both fact and value in the etymology of a semantic genotype or field.

In this family of value and recognition, one can say he *praised* her virtue. She had the value of the ring *appraised*. The family began to *depreciate* the actions of the young man. Such behavior *depreciates* the esteem and value of sacred matrimony. They put a *price* on his head. At first the property *appreciated* in value but has since greatly *depreciated*. She won the *prize*. Everything in the store was *overpriced*. She decided to buy shares in a *precious* metals fund. Finally she abandoned the *preciosity* of her engagement. What was left was *precious* little. He said, "I really *appreciate* everything you've done for me" and walked out.

This semantic cluster is the product of a matrix of concerns and questions: what is the nature of a certain object, person event, or state of affairs? What is its value? Who evaluates? What is the relation of the evaluator to others in the recognition of value? Does the evaluator enjoy the value? Do others? Is the evaluation expressed or just felt? Is the evaluation or evaluator ironic? In this semantic cluster, a degree of value recognized is always present, but never without investigation and recognition of an object for what it is. Even to price an object is to determine what it is as others will comprehend it in recognition of its commodity value. Merely to evaluate does not give the same emphasis to investigation: appreciation is investigation as well as mere evaluation. *Praise* and *depreciate* are at opposite ends of a scale of the evaluator's judgement in a verbal declaration to others. *Appreciation* occurs between, but, as an affective response to value, does not have to be expressed verbally to others. An item that is the object of appreciation can itself

intransitively appreciate or depreciate in value but cannot itself "*praise*" in value since what is praised is fixed at the top of a scale of value. This intransitive activity of appreciating or depreciating still entails, however, the agency of an evaluator, who is implied in the axiology of the appreciating or depreciating item. *Price* and *prize* are distinguished by who pays or receives and are both distinguished from *precious* by what will fetch a high price or by what is required for a high price and will be recognized by everybody as what will be recognized by everybody as precious. This semantic cluster combining affective response in fact and value manifests the presumption of our innate language faculty that the human world we make will also combine fact and value. It also argues for an ancient and innate economics of trade and commodity--that humans recognize, value, exchange, and enjoy stuff. Recognition and positive experience combine in a matrix with facts and value to delineate the semantic field of *appreciation*. In general, an object alone is not enough to guide our appreciation or, more precisely, in a world where there are no facts without value, the object must exist with value. In a vacuum of value, no object can exist. The object of appreciation is discovered in the cultural heuristic of our value seeking.

As a discovery, the act of appreciation cannot be specified beforehand. If you're trying to do a cartwheel, what you're supposed to do can be easily specified. But if you're trying to appreciate some object of your attention, no particular specifications can represent what you will do. The desire to appreciate something lacks enactive specifications, like any desire that animates the mereology of its object such as contemplation, wanderlust, experience, imagination. The intentionality of some of these "nonrep desires," as Susan Feagin terms them (51), may be compatible with aversion and disgust. But because appreciation cannot be blended with disgust, the mereology of its object tends to become the totality of a world version that is all right. But the world we actually live in cannot be appreciated for its wickedness. The world we hope to appreciate, we catch only a glimpse of in moments of visionary grace. For all the best intentions of our intentionality, and despite the occasional foretaste of what we can truly appreciate, we live in a fallen world yet to be redeemed in the progress of its history. So we play games of make-believe in artworks; intentional attitudes become pretensional. Everything the world is becomes the pretense of a different everything, or some part of the world is taken to be the pretense of an everything itself. The integral order that such an otherworld must have as an everything may then constitute the aesthetic focus of our appreciation. When sick sorrow faces another day or boredom drags along, we make up a shining otherworld where wit and joy sustain our interest and wickedness is

absent or has been overcome. In an otherworld version never corrupted by wickedness, such appreciation is developed through innocence; in a fallen otherworld, appreciation attends on the redemption of guilt.

In this way the integral nature of appreciation induces the development of two kinds of art: (1) parergonal art, which works from one or several continuous swatches of the present actual world in the present perfect immediacy of auto-exemplification, and (2) the art of fiction, which works from the whole actual world in the mediacy of a non-self-referential symbolic scheme to constitute an otherworld with a past, not merely a present perfect immediacy. Parergonal art has two quite different varieties: (A) boundary art, which makes a world from a swatch of the believed world and only one rule, that you can't go out of bounds, and (B) ludic art, which adds more than just this one rule to the laws of nature.

These ways of making a world all right give full scope to acts of appreciation, since at any point without true estimation of worth appreciation fails. In the heuristics of Western culture, the disorder of unworthiness and wickedness can not be appreciated, moreover, no matter how accurately you have sized them up as a disordering of ethical priorities and appropriately responded. As evil, they cannot have any order in the world version where they are evil, and without order there is nothing there to be appreciated. You cannot set a price on wickedness itself; you must value what you appreciate. And without value, appreciation is as meaningless as facts without value. Historical facts, accordingly, can be the object of a severe appreciation, even when they result from wickedness, providing you hope history will turn out to have been wonderful. Like the fortunate fall of Eve and Adam, historical acts of wickedness require all history for their outcome in glory, and in this hope even wicked sectors of the historical, actual world can be appreciated as part of an integral whole. As an activity in progress, appreciation looks to the final and integral value of its object, which, accordingly, is not only appreciated for this and that feature but also for itself integrally. But no sector disordered by wickedness can be appreciated in isolation, in and for itself and for every aspect of itself, including its wickedness. So until it is fully corrected as a righteous and "right" world version, the whole fallen world in the immediate present cannot be appreciated. The righteous who believe they are in a fallen world version cannot appreciate it at the moment, not yet. Only innocent segments of the immediate present can be appreciated entirely in and for themselves and pretended to be "totally everything" whose every aspect as this extra or parergonal work of worldmaking can be innocently appreciated and de-

finied within the spatio-temporal implication of limits, frames, borders, edges, boundaries of exclusion, and the mind set of play.

But a guilty segment of the immediate present in the fallen world cannot be appreciated in and for itself: we cannot make performance art out of an IRA bombing. Nor could we appreciate it in and for itself. We could appreciate it as a part of history we have faith in being redeemed, but that is not likely in the scope of our normal consciousness if we are immediately present, sensitive to its full horror and the screaming of innocent victims. We could size up what is going on; we could respond appropriately in light of that sizing up by helping the wounded, say. But we could not be appreciating the bombing while present immediately on the scene if we found it morally abhorrent. And similarly, we would not be appreciating a rape if we were tied up and forced to watch, if we found it abhorrent. A saint with greater scope of consciousness or faith in the redemption of history might respond appropriately to wickedness and still appreciate what is going on as a part of history, no part of which we will want undone in a redeemed afterlife. On a cross, a martyr could have been appreciating what was happening in its relational properties to the supervenient whole of an integral creation. But the martyr could not be appreciating what was happening without the mereology of these relational properties, in virtue of which a deep sense of joy is never lost. Martyrs do not give into despair even though they do not enjoy it and are not enjoying themselves. To say a martyr enjoyed his crucifixion and was enjoying himself is incoherent because the object of *enjoy* is entirely given as the crucifixion or the state of the self, which could not be enjoyed. Jesus didn't appreciate being crucified, and it sounds flip to say so because the meiosis suggests a not unfaceted power of distal observation over another's suffering. But to say we are not able to appreciate something unless we have sized up its relational properties to the whole world is taking mereology too far. And conversely, we may understand some sector of the world we have sized up very well as abhorrent, and not appreciate it one bit.

The complex structure of appreciation is thus not entirely captured by Allen Carlson's description of it as a sizing up together with responsiveness: "what indicates appropriate appreciation is that it involves correct, knowledge-based sizing up together with responsiveness appropriate in light of that sizing up" (397). As in the bombing and rape examples, an eye witness can size up the situation correctly and respond appropriately and still not appreciate the situation. Carlson surely doesn't want to insist the sizing up must be the illumination of a saint or a sizing up all seized up in the incoherence of a totality of truth. An acceptable sizing up and an appropriate response at the

time are only necessary conditions for appreciation, not sufficient. What is missing is an affective enjoyment implied in Carlson's phrase "appropriate appreciation," as if there could be an inappropriate appreciation that was still appreciation. Assessment of what is "sized up" cannot be inappropriate without an affective response subject to moral judgement. Without the affective response, the assessment could only be more or less accurate, not more or less appropriate. Carlson's argument is intended to counter Stan Godlovitch's claim that we can appreciate the mystery of nature without our normal "forms of cognitive anchorage" (28). If a mystery were something we can't size up in any way, then we could have no appreciation of it since appreciation does require an object-directed intentionality: without recognition of something that is sized up in that recognition, there is nothing to appreciate. If we understand so little about nature that it cannot be classified or subsumed under a concept, then Godlovitch is talking not about nature appreciation but nature worship. But even worship requires some recognition of its object as worthy of that worship. A mystery can be sized up "as" a mystery, which can then be the object of appreciation, just as we can appreciate the sublime—if we make the terrifying leap of faith in its value and, accordingly, its basic goodness. The realist concern that response be appropriate to what is really there leads to appreciation only if it is also morally appropriate to the recognition and enjoyment of value.

In an object of appreciation, attention may be focused either on the sequential apprehension of a process in time or on the non-sequential apprehension of what is already present in a field of vision and speculative space. Since apprehension itself takes place in space-time, either may be the focus of attention. Harold Osborne develops a theory of appreciation based on "synoptic apprehension" (202) appropriate for a focus on the spatial extension of art objects and their speculative "space." Susan Feagin develops a theory suitable for temporal extension based on "skilled activity as a process" (11) and its affective moment in "getting the value out of something" (23). A synthesis of these two accounts would be welcome for the aesthetics of appreciation. Since my own project, moreover, is to define art as a game with the goal of appreciation, this synthesis would be required for such a general account of art. What Feagin says of fiction would then, according to this definition, be true of any artwork: appreciating art "does not lead to a separable product, it is constitutive of it" (36).

Osborne says appreciation is a "full and satisfying . . . experience" of "something" we take an "aesthetic attitude towards"—the "percipience" of an "awareness for its own sake" (18-19). Within the spectrum of the present,

a "material thing" (202) is presented to the senses and is brought into being as an "aesthetic object" given "(i) special attention to supervenient qualities, expressive or emotional qualities, and structural or formal qualities; (ii) synoptic apprehension of the presentation as a configurational whole" (202). Such appreciation demands an intense effort of concentration in the exercise of skilled faculties of "percipience" (203), but does not comprehend in its synoptic intention the affective flux of process. Spatial extension in the visual arts, the anagogical level of narrative, and the *alles zusammen* of music are the source of value for appreciation in this aesthetic mode of percipience.

Feagin's process-oriented appreciation, on the other hand, looks to a "temporally extended, sequential interaction with an object" (37) for value as the successful exercise of "an ability" (37). Appreciation is thus the achievement of success in doing something and continuing to do it "in the sense of engaging in skilled activity as a process" (11), like climbing a mountain up through the beauty of alpine meadows and keeping on. It is not the final achievement of having done something successfully or the production of a product like having mastered the mountain and being on top. For Susan Feagin, getting there is not just half the fun, it's all the fun. For Harold Osborne, all the fun is in finally arriving. Those who carry the holy grail within achieve their quest in the discovery the grail is the quest. Those who seek it in the "other" must prick on and come to that place where now they are not. At the lone crossroads of his quest, in overtime, the knight readies his hockey stick. He shoots. He scores! Glory pours forth in his achievement of the holy goal.

Susan Feagin has developed an aesthetics of appreciation suitable for our sequential and processional participation in the self-consuming artifacts of fiction as we read "with feeling" (1). Such processional appreciation seems needlessly restricted to texts as an interaction with an "external object, where inscriptions need to be interpreted" (41). Landscape, pictures, and sculpture can also be appreciated in this processional mode, even though they would not be part of a study of reading such as *Reading with Feeling*. But even as an appreciation of fiction only, the processional mode is not enough. The synchronic mode à la Osborne is also required for the synoptic allegory of the anagogical level, what Troilus sees from the eighth sphere with Boethius. When we have finished a novel we can think of it all in its afterlife; this meditation of retrospection is not the process of reading: the book is already closed. The hockey game can be appreciated after it's over as well as during the play. "That was a good game," we say, and we continue to appreciate it, not as a statistic in some team's favour or an entry in a list of games

but as the remembered game comprehended as a whole with mental percipience. The anticipation of this synoptic anagogy in a narrative may be encouraged during the reading by figural flashbacks such as the fulfillments of Biblical typology or in the viewing of a film such as *The English Patient* by flashbacks drawn out as the living past in Dantesque percipience.

Feagin does make reflection on the appropriateness of the affective response you have been or are having one of the "three components of appreciation" (161): "affective . . . , theoretical [viz. interpretive], reflective" (23). But this sort of reflection on the appropriateness of particular emotions you are having at the time is not of the same order of reflection on the "synoptic apprehension" of the work as a whole in its afterlife. A synoptic apprehension and reflection takes place in the flux of our temporal order, as everything must for human activity, but points to an order out of time in an afterlife of eternal appreciation or in the eternal present of illumination. Such atemporal emotion is moving for us humans, who die, despite its transcendent oxymoron of unmoving emotion. Motion in the flux of process is just what such emotion is not, and not about, finally. Without the affective response of such synoptic apprehension, there would be no beauty left, finally. As Wallace Stevens says: "Death is the mother of beauty, mystical, in whose burning bosom we devise our earthly mothers, waiting sleeplessly" ("Sunday Morning"). Without the anticipation of some finality that "seals up all in rest" present process could not be anticipated as having been anything more than present process and we could not love that well, as Shakespeare says, which we "must leave ere long" (Sonnet 73). Teleology and the beauty of hope would evaporate into a boring and endless and, ultimately, incoherent present without the possibility of any additional truth. Both present and past totalities of fact are incoherent: they need each the other for their own incompleteness so there can always be more truth to come in their "afterlife."

The parameters of such logic are built into the semantics of the complex word *appreciate*. We can "appreciate the fact that," for whatever fact, like it or not. We can appreciate the fact that the holocaust took place. We don't like it; nor do we value what took place as an isolated event or image independent of the history it is part of, but we do find it valuable to recognize the fact that it did take place. But we cannot pick out wicked parts of disorder for appreciation. We can appreciate the horror of the holocaust and its place in history, but we cannot coherently appreciate the holocaust for its horror. Most of us value facts as facts, and so wouldn't say "I don't appreciate the fact that" whatever the fact or how horrible: what has happened we may not yet appreciate but not its status as a

fact. "To value the fact that" or "To value that something took place" is not idiomatic, interestingly, probably because *value* does not include the component of investigation and recognition *appreciation* does. But because *appreciation* includes positive value (the only coherent kind), our use of it for facts implies an innate hope for the value of all history in the continuous generation of facts, not that there are some parts of history or particular facts we definitely should never appreciate; and this argues for our innate, ingrained faith in its redemption, that it will turn out all right. Hence the power of the anagogical mode of narrative, that the righteous and compassionate judgement of what happened permits the atemporal "process" of synoptic appreciation.

In such ways the complexity of the innate semantics of the word *appreciate* comes to bear on the appreciation of art and thence on the constitution of art as a game with the goal of appreciation. Because *appreciate* is one word, not two, all its senses participate in each other. We mistake the complexity of this semantic field when we take the word to have one meaning here and another meaning there as if we had two discrete homonyms like *be* and *bumble bee*. The semantic primes in the complexity of *appreciate* have not fragmented into different words as they have for *river bank* and *money bank*. (The early meaning of *bank* as a raised shelf of earth or wood included *bench*, which was extended in Italian to a money changer's table and thence with the Renaissance trade of banking to a bank for money.) This integral complexity of the entry in our mental lexicon for *appreciate* is manifest in nice distinctions of its idiom. Consider the semantic forces at work in the expression *I don't appreciate*. With regard to a general and non-progressive truth, I may say; in the simple present tense, "I don't appreciate plastic furniture"; or with progressive force as a momentary affect, "I don't appreciate the tone of your voice." The meaning of the idiom is not merely to enjoy but also to size up.

This complexity is evident in pressures on the idiom when used reflexively in the first person with a passive gerund: "I don't appreciate being--stood up, robbed, yelled at, cheated, raped, shot, murdered, martyred." Circumstances in which it would make sense to say any of this all imply a distal analysis or sizing up. To replace *appreciate* with *enjoy* in the idiom would make it either trite truth or trite irony. To say "I don't enjoy being robbed" is trite as a general truth and trite as sarcasm implying the robber thinks you do, since it's obvious to both of you that you are being robbed. But to say, "I don't appreciate being robbed" implies your distal discovery of the robbery the robber thought you didn't know about. In such a discovery it would be more natural to say "I don't appreciate

being cheated" since a cheat tries to conceal the deed and robbery usually doesn't take any discovering. Because all these gerunds contain the idea of aversion, their not being appreciated implies not merely the tautological lack of enjoyment but also their discovery in a distal sizing up of the action as the deed it is and your response to it. After a couple has come to grief in the role-playing of a pretend rape, the woman might say, "I guess I don't appreciate being raped." But during an actual rape it would make no sense except as the sarcastic opposite of what could sensibly be said in the situation. With a tone of late imperial irony, a martyr could say "Hey boys, I don't really appreciate being martyred," as if they were stupid enough to think he did or that it could ever make sense to say this either while being martyred or after in a distal analysis, because there isn't any after--at least not in this life. And similarly, for the wit of being shot or murdered. In all uses, the idiom makes no sense without the element of distal analysis in a sizing up of what is not appreciated. The word *appreciate*, as Carlson argues, always involves the idea of "sizing up" even when its primary meaning is to enjoy. And conversely, contra Carlson, *appreciate* always involves the idea of enjoyment as indicated by our possible lack of appreciation for an IRA bombing that we have accurately sized up and are appropriately responding to with alacrity.

The impetus for distal analysis triggered by the tautology of not appreciating what is intrinsically abhorrent may expand the focus of what is appreciated into a synoptic percipience. This synopsis of a glorious history permits a retrospective appreciation of all its parts, even those ones that could not have been appreciated at the time. And in anticipation of this anagogical retrospection even a martyr could say "I have faith some day I will be able to appreciate all that is happening to me," even though the martyr could not appreciate being martyred. The emotion of anagogical appreciation is supervenient on the truth of historical appreciation in progress, which is not changed by that anagogical synopsis no matter how faithfully anticipated and enforced. The supervenience of an aesthetic disinterest derives from an integrity of parts in a glorious history without changing any part of that history appreciated in its totality. A part that cannot be appreciated in isolation can be appreciated as a part of a whole.

Because both discovery and enjoyment are implicit in appreciation, to say "I do not appreciate what I enjoy" or "I can appreciate what I don't understand," accordingly, would seem to have no sensible context. The semantics won't fit. The value appreciated must be personally enjoyed by the agent of appreciation, who must also understand the nature of what is being appreciated. *Joy* and *like* are thus distinguished from each other by intention-

ality because you can appreciate something you don't much like: "I appreciate modern art but I don't much like it," or "I can appreciate this opera, but I don't like it." But you can't meaningfully say, "I appreciate this opera, but I don't enjoy it"; although, if something were preventing you from enjoying it in the present progressive, you could say, "I appreciate this opera, but I'm not enjoying it"--but not "I'm not liking it." The intentionality of volition is required to enjoy something and feel good about getting the value out of it and to this extent have a pleasurable sensation, even though those automatic responses you have no control over may respond with aversion. *Like* is a stative verb referring to the state of your likes and dislikes that you can't do much about. "I am liking this ice-cream" is not English. *Love* is a peculiar stative verb in that you decide what your affections *are*, since we can reasonably be commanded to love. Thus because *love* requires volition, "I don't appreciate what I love" and "I appreciate what I hate" make no sense except as an expression of hysteric loss of control and violation of volition. Because volition is enjoyed, it makes sense to say "I can appreciate what I have to do, even if I don't like it." It even makes sense to say "I can appreciate what I have to do, even if I don't enjoy it," because what is not enjoyed is the doing of it, not the having to do it: the duty is enjoyed as the object of appreciation.

Since the affective response of valuing must be the agent of appreciation's own, *appreciate* is close to the semantic field of *like* and what appeals to your own particular taste. In this semantic proximity, *appreciate* is rare in the progressive aspect of any tense in the first person, not only because the stative aspect of your affections is suggested but because appreciating takes all or most of your attention and does not itself become the object of attention without displacing the original object of appreciation. So when distracted, we may say, "Be quiet I am appreciating this performance" or "I'm sorry you interrupted; I was appreciating that performance." But, otherwise, appreciation is "expressed" and not reported on in the having of it. "I am appreciating drinking this wine" is an unlikely mouthful, while contradiction would prevent "I am appreciating being raped." In the second and third person, the progressive aspect occurs frequently enough: "Are you appreciating this discussion?"; "He is appreciating the attentions of that young women." Your own affective response, moreover, may imply an objective contrast with others' as in "I can appreciate a good cigar" (whereas others deficient in this recognition of value can't). Because the appreciation of art occurs in the consummate immediacy of undivided attention, a course in art appreciation implies talking about it and instruction at the beginning level in preparation for this immediacy of appreciating art.

But because *appreciate* is not the simple affective response of *like*, the investigation of what is sized up for appreciation is directed to evaluation as well as an assessment of the facts. Value can be recognized independently of personal likes and dislikes in a disinterested way for and in itself and so on. To be *disinterested* still bears the marks of its confusing descent from Latin *inter-esse* to be between or mixed up in and of relevant (legal) importance and its appearance in seventeenth-century English as uninterested and then in the scientific and aesthetic enlightenment as impartial, with a lack of selfishness or self interest. *Disinterested* is a helpful word when its object is merely the part of an integrated whole. But when the integrated whole is itself the object of disinterested attention, incoherence sets in without the participation of an observing consciousness and its affective response. You can't believe in an everything where you're not. You can't make-believe in a pretend everything where you have no counterpart. Nor can you love and believe in yourself in a *disinterested* way, in both senses of the word. If games involve play in a pretend everything and artworks engage us in the heuristic of such play, disinterest in the goal of the game is not effective. But neither is selfish liking. Nor is pure enjoyment. If the object of an artwork were pure joy and blissed out disinterest, then the joy as an effort of the will could dispense with the artwork. Not that any particular artwork is more important than joy which is prior in its grace to any contingency enjoyed and sized up! The constitution of a particular artwork is thus not its mere enjoyment or happiness but its appreciation. The artwork must be sized up to be enjoyed as that particular artwork. And sizing it up without enjoyment is jejune in a vacuum of value.

The word *appreciate* in its ancient semantic field of facts assessed with an affective response to their enjoyed value, thus, wins the prize as the best term for our constitution of artworks. Without affective appeal, value is valueless and the evaluator jejune; without moral effect, value is mere whim and may be unrighteous and, in effect, with-

out value. To be valuable, value must be valued. The enjoyment of this valuing is an emotional affect--to be appreciated along with an accuracy of fact, which in turn can be fact only in some everything or world of value. Appreciation is thus an achievement, the worthy goal of an artwork. To achieve the quest of the wholly artwork is its appreciation--the heuristic by which it is constituted and enjoyed.

REFERENCES

- Carlson, Allen. "Appreciating art and appreciating nature." Kemal, Salim and Ivan Gaskell, eds. *Landscape, natural beauty and the arts*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Carlson, Allen. "Nature, Aesthetic Appreciation, and Knowledge." *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 53 (1995): 393-400.
- Chomsky, Noam. *The Minimalist Program*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1995.
- Empson, William. *The Structure of Complex Words* 2nd edition. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1957.
- Feagin, Susan L. *Reading with Feeling: The Aesthetics of Appreciation*. Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.
- Godlovitch, Stan. "Icebreakers: Environmentalism and Natural Aesthetics." *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 11 (1994): 15-30.
- Lehrer, Adrienne. *Semantic Fields and Lexical Structure*. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1974.
- Osborne, Harold. *The Art of Appreciation*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.